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1 Introduction
How can probabilistic statements be understood in the deterministic theory of classical statistical
mechanics? Are they epistemic, i.e. do they reflect our ignorance of the exact state of a system,
or objective, in the sense that they represent relative frequencies of some sort? Are there perhaps
other options? These questions are central in Guttmann’s book.
The core of the book is formed by the discussion of four positions, spread over epistemic and
objective interpretations of probability, which all get a ‘charitable exposition’ (to use Guttmann’s
words) but are in the end dismissed. In the fifth chapter, emerging from the foregoing discussion,
three different solution schemes come to the fore. The book ends with three appendices containing
varied background information.
The author is undeniably original. Especially the chapters on the Haar measure (Ch. 3) and on
topological dynamics (Ch. 4) constitute a fresh line of approach, and contain stimulating new ideas.
In these chapters the striking connections between measure theoretical and topological notions
are explored, and the implications for the philosophical foundations of statistical mechanics are
investigated. Guttmann gives a comprehensive account of these two frameworks for statistical
mechanics, which each in their own way provide a method of dealing with incomplete information.
Within measure theory lack of information about the exact phase point of a system is translated
into a statement about the probability that the system is in a certain region in phase space. With
the tools of topological dynamics one can describe the approximate behaviour of systems in terms of
nearby trajectories. Guttmann also discusses surprising connections such as the ‘duality theorem’
(p. 158) which allows one to translate theorems directly from one framework into the other.
In many respects the book falls somewhat outside the traditional literature on the foundations
of statistical mechanics. This could have made it a highly valuable contribution to this area, but
unfortunately it doesn’t live up to its promise. Inaccuracies and errors, both in argumentation and
in technical detail, are present in too large numbers. Therefore, the book is not suited as a first
introduction to the subject (as it is meant to be). Only someone who is already familiar with the
subject, and prepared to check everything, will be able to extract valuable ideas.
That these errors may have far-reaching consequences is illustrated by the following quotation:
‘The canonical distribution, when restricted to any subensemble, remains essentially
the same. This fact, in and of itself, implies that we cannot improve our predictions by
taking into account additional information.’ (p. 210)
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Guttmann repeatedly stresses the importance of this observation, and to a large extent bases his
judgement about the ergodic approach and the works of Jaynes and Gibbs on it (see pp. 53, 59–60,
197–198, 210, 214). However, it is blatantly wrong. When restricted to a subsystem the canonical
distribution retains its exponential form. But suppose for instance that new information reveals
that the system’s energy lies in the tail of the canonical distribution. Certainly restriction to the
subensemble of systems with this energy value will improve our predictions.
An example of mathematical inaccuracy is Guttmann’s discussion of the problem of “updating”
in the theory of subjective probabilities. Here, the question is how to revise a prior probability
assignment when new information is received. He discusses a theorem by Seidenfeld (1986, pp. 471–
473), which presents conditions under which two rival methods of updating, namely the Maximum
Entropy formalism and Bayesian conditionalisation, agree. Guttmann reports that there is no
conflict between these two methods when ‘new information leads us to a new probability distribution
p∗ that concentrates on a set of events with [prior] probability zero or [prior] probability one’ (p. 59).
In fact, however, Seidenfeld’s result proves that there is no conflict if all constraints under which
entropy is maximised are of the form E[Ie] = 0 or E[Ie] = 1 (i.e. the expectation value of the indicator
function for some event e is either zero or one). Thus, he formulates particular conditions on the
constraints, not on the posterior distribution p∗. Another example is that Guttmann incorrectly
limits the validity of the ergodic theorem (p. 77) to ergodic evolutions.
There are innumerable typos and sloppy notation, which make the text difficult to read. Pages
47–48 are a pain to the eye, where the symbol x has two different meanings within a single expression,
where symbols are missing, and where ∞ is denoted as 00. Another example is pp. 137–139; here B
denotes both an algebra and a specific element of that algebra, and some errors are made in copying
from (Banach, 1937): {bn} ⊂ Sn in the fifth axiom of congruence should read {bn} ⊂ Gn, and the
order of limits in P4 is wrong. These make it impossible to understand the text without checking
the reference oneself.
My general opinion is that due to its sloppiness this book has missed the opportunity to become
the standard reference on probability in statistical physics. Still it offers enough interesting material
to be of value to the specialist, and I hope especially that the parts on the connection between mea-
sure theory and topological dynamics (Ch. 4, Sections 5.2 and 5.3) will encourage further research.
In the following I will single out two issues: ergodic theory (Ch. 2) and the Haar measure (Ch. 3).
2 Ergodic theory
The branch of mathematics called ergodic theory was developed in the early twentieth century in
connection with problems in the foundations of statistical mechanics. Ergodic theory is clearly
relevant for foundational issues, but still opinions diverge on the role it can play, the particular
questions that it addresses and the answers it can give (see Van Lith, 2001 for a survey of the
foundational roles of ergodic theory). An example is the very interesting outline of a subjectivist
approach based on ergodic theory which Guttmann presents in his second chapter. His description of
the standard ergodic approach is also surprising and unorthodox, as I will indicate below. Familiar
theorems appear in a different perspective when used in an unexpected new foundational role.
The orthodox use of ergodic theory in the foundations of statistical mechanics proceeds via
Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem and its corollary. The theorem states that for a measure-preserving
dynamical system infinite time averages exist for almost all initial conditions. The corollary states
that if the system obeys a certain dynamical condition, called metrical transitivity or ergodicity,
those infinite time averages are equal to the microcanonical phase average, again for almost all
initial conditions. Physics textbook wisdom has it that thermodynamic measurements take such a
long time compared to microscopic relaxation times that they can be taken to yield infinite time
averages. The above ergodic theorems then provide the justification for calculating microcanonical
phase averages for predicting measurement results.
In his discussion of the ergodic approach Guttmann gives a non-orthodox twist to this story
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by identifying probabilities with infinite time averages. That is, Guttmann considers a frequency
interpretation of probability where the repetitions occur in a single system in the course of time,
rather than (as is standard) across an ensemble of identically prepared systems. With probabilities
identified with time averages, the ergodic theorem plays a different role than outlined above: It
demonstrates under what conditions probabilities are equal to the microcanonical measure. But
probabilities so understood cannot change in the course of time, making an embedding of this
interpretation of equilibrium statistical mechanics into the general non-equilibrium theory awkward
if not impossible. The appendix III is evidence of this; here Guttmann nevertheless tries to extend
his version of frequentism to non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, resulting in such unfortunate
claims as that a probability density that evolves in the infinite time limit into a stationary density
is merely a “notational variant” of the latter.
Very interesting is the subjectivist version of the ergodic approach, presented in Sections 2.7
and 2.8. Here Guttmann presents a generalisation of the well-known representation theorem of
De Finetti, and the opportunities this theorem offers for a subjective interpretation of probability.
The theorem (the ergodic decomposition theorem) says that every stationary probability measure
on a bounded space S can be decomposed uniquely into ergodic components (i.e. into probability
measures that are ergodic on a subspace of S). The ergodic components in turn can be connected to
relative times of sojourn in their respective subspaces, and so with objective features of the system.
This means that every personal probability ascription, as long as it is stationary, can be represented
as a subjective expectation of objective frequencies.
This representation theorem holds for stationary measures only. Guttmann makes an effort to
justify stationarity, and discusses four possible justifications that according to him all fail. This
is because to a subjectivist only coherence requirements are compelling, but stationarity cannot
be enforced on grounds of coherence. But the same can be said of exchangeability in De Finetti’s
original theorem and still the representation theorem is seen as very important in that context.
3 Haar measure
According to the corollary of the ergodic theorem that holds for metrically transitive systems, there
may be a measure zero set of exceptions to the equality of time and phase averages. In the third
chapter, Guttmann makes a heroic attempt to get rid of these exceptions. He does so by considering
the Haar measure on the group of Hamiltonian time evolution operators, which is supposed to
form a bridge between the Lebesgue measure on the one hand, and the time measure (i.e. the
measure that attributes to each set the relative time of sojourn), and thus infinite time averages on
the other. The goal of the chapter is to investigate the dynamical conditions needed to establish
that this bridge is one of strict identity. A brave goal indeed, since counterexamples can easily be
imagined in the presence of metrical transitivity, thus demonstrating that the sought-for dynamical
conditions must be even stronger. Such counterexamples of course form a set of measure zero, but
nevertheless concrete cases can be pointed out; for instance periodic phase trajectories generally
yield time averages very different from phase averages. It is therefore not a surprise that in the end
Guttmann dismisses the Haar construction because of limited applicability. Nevertheless it contains
many interesting and valuable ideas.
Let me outline the way in which Guttmann connects the Haar measure to both phase and time
measures. In any book on topological groups one can find a treatment of the Haar measure, being
the measure on a topological group which is invariant under the group action. The existence and
uniqueness of such a measure were shown by Haar in the 1920s by an explicit construction. In
the present application, the group consists of the Hamiltonian time evolution operators, which is a
one-parameter transformation group. If this group is represented by the time parameter, its Haar
measure is given by the Lebesgue measure on the real line. However, it is not the Lebesgue measure
on the real line, but on the phase space that is of interest for the present application. Guttmann
manages to make a connection with the latter by modifying Haar’s original construction. Also, he
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argues that the measure thus constructed on phase space is equal without exception to the time
measure. Let me explain this in some detail.
The key notion is that of congruence. Let 〈S,B〉 be a measurable space. Following Banach’s
treatment of the Haar measure, Guttmann presents an axiomatic definition of a congruence relation
between elements of B. Next, a function is defined in terms of this notion of congruence which is
shown to be a measure; basically, it assigns equal values to congruent sets. The important point is
that the axioms of congruence can be satisfied, in certain cases, by use of a group: Two sets A and B
are congruent iff there is an element g of the group connecting them, gA = B. The connection with
the time measure is guaranteed by the fact that the group at issue is the group of time evolutions.
However, in order for this construction to work, the group has to be transitive, i.e. for all points
a, b ∈ S there must be a transformation g such that ga = b.
In the original Haar construction the space S is the topological group itself. Therefore, transi-
tivity isn’t a problem: It follows immediately from the group structure. But in Guttmann’s version
of it, S is the phase space. Transitivity now presents itself as a huge obstacle. In fact, it demands
that all points in phase space lie on a single trajectory; this is nothing less than the original Ergodic
Hypothesis which is known to be false if the dimension of phase space is larger than one!
The rest of the chapter is a struggle to surmount the requirement of transitivity. Guttmann
discusses several possibilities to weaken transitivity, and investigates in those cases whether a con-
gruence relation can still be defined. It is a pity that he loses sight of the aim of connecting phase
and time averages in this discussion; that is, he does not check whether the modified congruence
relations still enable one to define a measure that (like the Haar measure) is connected to both phase
and time averages.
So what does this leave us with? Does Guttmann make headway with respect to the ergodic
approach, or does the Haar construction only work for systems obeying the Ergodic Hypothesis?
In fact there is one small victory here, but Guttmann forgets to stress it: For so-called minimal
systems (p. 143), i.e. systems for which every phase trajectory is dense, the group of time evolution
operators defines a congruence relation that indeed leads to the standard measure on phase space.
4 Three solutions?
The book ends with three proposed solutions that emerge from the foregoing discussion. Here is
how Guttmann formulates the problem:
‘If probabilities are not physical parameters that we discover by methods of observa-
tion and measurement only, how can we justify our willingness to be guided by them?
How can we explain the utility of probabilities?’ (p. 190)
4.1 The extension of the subjectivist framework
The first solution is subjectivist in spirit, and consists in a subjective interpretation of both prob-
abilities (as degrees of belief) and distances between phase points (as judgements of similarity). In
order to find the “subjective distance” between two points s and s′ that represent the system M
in phase space, one has to imagine two hypothetical “epistemic situations” E and E ′ formed by
combining one’s current body of beliefs supplemented with the knowledge that M is in state s or s′
respectively. Next, one has to make a “similarity judgement” of E and E ′. Thus, s and s′ are close
iff E and E′ are similar. Guttmann makes it plausible that this concept of subjective distance in-
deed obeys the metric axioms. Just like subjective probabilities, subjective distances may vary from
person to person. Also, subjective distances need not coincide with objective notions of distance
such as distance along a phase trajectory.
Guttmann himself isn’t entirely satisfied with this solution, but I think he pitches his demands
high. First, he sees problems that are based on the confusion between subensembles and subsys-
tems mentioned earlier (see p. 198). Second, he jumps too quickly from giving an interpretation of
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probability, and explaining its utility, to justifying a particular expression for the probability dis-
tribution. This appears from his discussion of regularity (pp. 196–197), which is a property of the
microcanonical measure that connects measure theoretical and topological notions. According to
Guttmann the fact that the microcanonical measure is regular imposes extra conditions for subjec-
tive probabilities and distances, but that is only the case if the goal is to justify the microcanonical
measure, rather than the utility of probabilities in general. A consistent subjective interpretation
of both probabilities and distances seems perfectly possible.
4.2 Reformulation of the aims of the ergodic approach
As his second solution Guttmann presents a framework which encompasses both measure theory
and topological dynamics. The central notion is an abstract system 〈S,B, W, T 〉, which generalises
both dynamical and topological systems. As usual S is the phase space and T the group of time
evolution operators. B is a set of subsets of S, and it generalises the algebra (measure theory)
and the collection of open sets (topological dynamics). W is the subset of B of sets that count as
“small”; this generalises measure zero sets (measure theory) and sets of first category (topological
dynamics).
Guttmann gives a convincing presentation of the abstract theory that so emerges. Various quanti-
ties that have played important roles in earlier chapters (ergodicity, relative frequencies, recurrence,
boundedness) are now defined in terms of abstract systems. And indeed, by choosing either the
measure theoretical or the topological dynamical interpretation of B and W , the abstract notions
reduce to the familiar ones. The framework gives a beautiful insight in the structural similarity of
the two modes of description of statistical mechanical systems.
But does it deliver what Guttmann claims, namely that ‘within this very elementary framework,
we can arrive at satisfactory explanations of the emergence of equilibrium in particular and the
phenomenon of deterministic randomness in general’ (p. 200)? I do not think so. In order to explain
the mentioned phenomena, some connection between the abstract formalism and the empirical world
has to be established. Presenting a synthetic framework does not relieve one of the task of giving
an interpretation of the concepts of the theory, be it measure theoretic, or topological dynamical, or
some alternative. Thus, what Guttmann presents here falls short as an answer to the interpretation
problem. It is more like refraining from interpretation.
4.3 Pragmatist foundations of SM
In a sense, pragmatism is an easy and attractive standpoint. Instead of explaining the utility of
probabilities one could just accept this utility and take advantage of it. Indeed, as Guttmann argues,
it is not necessary either to reduce probabilities to objective physical properties or to construe them
as degrees of belief. But even a pragmatist has to give some interpretation to probabilities, if only
to be able to judge whether the theory is in agreement with empirical reality. Here, the pragmatist
solution that Guttmann presents does not come into its own.
The pragmatist approach that Guttmann presents as his third solution to the interpretation
question is the “Gibbs-Khinchin formulation” of statistical mechanics. He claims that Khinchin’s
contributions to the foundations of statistical mechanics add to Gibbs’s pragmatist viewpoint the
necessary justification for using the (micro-)canonical distribution. I think this is based on a miscon-
ception of Khinchin’s theory (1949). According to Guttmann, Khinchin derived the microcanonical
distribution by using the central limit theorem (p. 213). But in fact Khinchin presupposed the
microcanonical distribution, and just applied the central limit theorem to it in order to investigate
its asymptotic behaviour. So the question where the microcanonical distribution comes from still
stands. After all, even Khinchin himself did not seek the answer to this question in his central limit
theorem but in ergodic theory.
None of these solutions is worked out in the necessary detail, and Guttmann acknowledges this
fact. In broad lines I agree with the author on the possible directions where solutions can be found,
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though one may wonder whether pragmatism doesn’t simply boil down to evading the question. A
subjective interpretation of probability seems unproblematic, though one then has to accept that
probabilities may differ from person to person, and thus that it is impossible to justify the particular
probability distributions that are used in statistical mechanics on coherence grounds.
The combination of measure theory and topological dynamics is especially promising, although
I have a somewhat different approach in mind, namely the one offered by Malament and Zabell
(1980). They argue that probabilities in statistical mechanics should obey a certain topological
notion (continuity under translations), which implies absolute continuity of the measure (a measure
theoretical notion). Together with some other assumptions (to wit, ergodicity and stationarity)
this singles out the standard measure uniquely, and thus gives a justification for the standard
measure (see also Vranas, 1998). This however raises further questions about the justification of the
topological notions at issue. For a detailed study of such questions Guttmann’s book offers plenty
of points of departure.
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